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The word “performativity” has become a fashionable academic shorthand term referring to 
theatricality or live action imbued within examples of visual culture.   But this misunderstanding, in 
its conflation of “performance” with “performativity”, misses out on the deconstructive whammy 
introduced into metaphysical presumptions about language and truth and, I want to argue here by 
extension, about visual imagery and truth that was put forward by the philosopher and speech-act 
theorist J.L. Austin in the 1950s. Austin’s ground-breaking lectures entitled “How To Do Things With 
Words,” delivered at Harvard in 1955, would subsequently be picked up by theorists such as Jacques 
Derrida and Judith Butler as starting points for identifying and questioning foundational 
presumptions of about representation itself.  Traditionally, according to the philosophical edifice 
established by Plato, representation, or mimesis, comprises a copy— designated a mere copy—of a 
concept of a thing, which is the “true” and “real” thing.  It is the essence of the thing. This entity 
cannot be an image.  Only philosophers and higher-minded men would be able to conceive of and 
construe this higher concept.  The rest of us are left with inferior versions of comprehending it: 
either a physical object which materialises it, or, even more inferior to the material object, a picture 
or a linguistic signifier of that object. To explain this mapping of mimesis, Plato, in Book X of The 
Republic, tells his pupil Glaucon the allegory of the three beds: the picture of the bed, is what is 
described in the dialogue between Glaucon and Socrates as “thrice removed” from what is real and 
Good, and therefore, the image is false and bad, because imitation, by its very nature, professes to 
be “true.”  And we might say that illustration is all about aiming to represent something with truth 
and accuracy.  But painting and poetry, as discussed in the dialogue of Book X of The Republic, are 
only copies of appearance—which is the material object—not of the real entity (which is an abstract 
concept).  This removal from Truth is characterised by Socrates to Glaucon as “deception.”   
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Thus, representation acquires, from Plato onwards, into the centuries, a highly negative 
charge.  But what it also acquires, from Plato onwards, is a particular relationality of referentiality.  A 
picture or word refer to something anterior to it.   While the virtuosity and inspiring aesthetic 
sensibilities of artists and writers since Plato have certainly proven Plato’s negative value judgement 
about representation to be misguided, what has stuck and not been dislodged quite so much is the 
less visible presupposition of referentiality itself, in other words, that an image or sentence exists in 
order to refer to or relate to, something, and that this referral is the image or word’s very function.  
The function of referentiality seems obvious when thinking about illustration.  Illustration tends to 
refer to text; or, it may refer to phenomenal objects (as in information illustration); or, it may refer 
to a person or an event.  The word “descriptive” could characterise this referential notion of 
illustration.  But even in what might be seen as the glory of description, illustration still sometimes 
retains the stigma of being a copy—it’s not the “real thing”, and, as such, is even, if slightly, less 
valued.   
Enter J.L. Austin, the post-war Oxford moral philosopher, so much of whose work focused on 
truth and truth-conditions of language.  For Austin, a linguistic utterance, or locution, was not, 
contrary to most philosophical approaches, about or founded upon the condition or value of “truth.”  
This view of language rather bucks the system.  To assume, said Austin, that language is based on 
conveying truth or stating something that “is”, is not understanding the workings of language, the 
operations of language, in short, the performativity of language.  This approach to language 
introduces a big leap or intervention which questions basic metaphysical, Platonic values.  It requires 
what Austin characterised as a “prising off”, or pulling apart of a long-established relation of 
referentiality governed by a hierarchy between copy and reality.  It proceeds along the assumption 
that words and images do not possess a neutral, logical transmissive property but are arbitrarily 
used a part of an operating system.  
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A large part of recognizing this arbitrariness of words, and, by my extension, of images, 
involves approaching language not as descriptive, or “constative,” Austin proposes, but as 
performative, meaning, that the utterance (which we understand here to be either verbal or 
imagistic) performs a particular action in its very utterance.  Austin’s prime examples of 
performative speech acts include the following: “I apologise”; “I hereby christen this ship HMS 
Pinnafore”; “I now pronounce you husband and wife”.   Here, the words are not describing 
something, that is, referring to what they mean; they are, in their very utterance, actually 
performing the action of those words.  They therefore offer an alternative model to the one which 
proceeds metaphysically, where the role of language is to state or describe something more “real” 
outside of itself.  For Austin, the referential function is replaced by the performative function.  To 
further elucidate his point about language’s performative function, Austin divides performative 
locutionary acts into two types: illocutionary speech acts, which perform an action in their 
utterance; and perlocutionary speech acts, the performed action of which are consequential to the 
speech act.   Both types offer alternatives to the truth-function implied by a referential model of 
language.  
Eventually, at the end of his lecture series on How to do things with Words, Austin comes to 
the conclusion that in fact, all language is performative, not just certain obvious speech acts such as 
“I apologise.”  And we can say the same of illustration: all illustration is performative in that it always 
functions illocutionarily, by the very virtue of its being relational. And sometimes, illustration also 
has a consequential action embedded within it, acting perlocutionarily.   
From the example of the infamous Charlie Hebdo illustration, we already know that an illustration is 
not simply descriptive or representative—we know that the making itself of this illustration 
constitutes an action (in some eyes, blasphemy), and that unfortunately, it also might also bear 
perlocutionary consequences.   
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In the words of J.L. Austin, “…words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: 
we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we 
can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers.”1 
A recent editorial illustration from the NYTimes illustration shows how Austin’s ideas of language can 
be easily transposed into the register of the image: an informational image depicting a ship is 
implied to be referring to a real ship which “exists”. However, this image can be warped and 
manipulated by a single act of tilting the phone, making the ship to appear to be sinking. That this 
illustration accompanies an article about the manipulation of fact on social media speaks to Austin’s 
point that language is not a neutral transmitter which presumably refers back to something real; on 
the contrary, representation is an operation, a high-performance machine.  In the larger 
philosophical perspective, language, for Austin, can be considered to be the proving ground for 
dislodging what philosophers would call the positivist assumption carried through years of Western 
philosophy beginning with Plato’s antagonism towards representation as imitation or mimesis.    
A useful term which encompasses both language and imagery is “discourse,” and this term is 
used frequently in much post-structuralist theory because it recognises an equivalence between high 
literature, populist literature, advertising, exhibitions, fine art, illustration, and so forth: all of these 
examples, and many more, can be read as productions of larger ideological value systems at work.  
The word “discourse” comes from the Latin root discursus, which means, “running about”.  So, 
discourse “gets around”, like a courrier, and, it has a span.    
Pornography is a prime example of “discourse”.  Today I want to look at the performative 
role of 18th-century pornography in France, with particular focus on the way in which pornographic 
 
1 Guy Longworth, “J. L. AUSTIN (1911–1960),” citing Austin, 1956a/1976  , 195, 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/longworth/research/austin_keythinkers.pdf, 
3.   
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pamphlets disseminated at the time of Marie Antoinette’s reign acted discursively to reinforce a new 
Republican national identity for France.  Pornographic novels came about in the mid-17th century, 
with a flourishing of pornographic pamphlets circulating in Europe and Britain in the 18th century.  
Historian Margaret C. Jacob attributes the introduction of this new literary discourse of pornography 
to the rise of urban social networks which brought forth new buyers and sellers, in all realms of the 
marketplace.  Transactions in private spaces—including sexual ones-- replaced activities previously 
determined by family, guilds, and churches.2  Much of the critical analysis of 18th-century 
pornography focuses on a new prominence of “the body” in both private and public discourse.  The 
sexual body which served as subject matter in the rise of the new genre of pornography 
corresponded to the collective public body first introduced as the body of the king in medieval times 
but which grew into the collective incorporated body suggested by Rousseau in The Social Contract  
in 1762.  As the eighteenth century progressed, the prevalent metaphor of the collective people as 
being the body of the King morphed into a Republican body whose unity and coherence was marked 
by a fraternal bonding.  This Revoluntionary cohesiveness relied upon the exclusion of any female 
bodies.  Marie Antoinette became the primary target, among other female bodies, to be deemed 
foreign, obscene, and traitorous to the nascent Republican body politic.   
As the historian Lynn Hunt has argued extensively,3 female sexuality posed a distinct threat to what 
Enlightenment philosophers, already long before the Revolution, proposed for an ideal body politic.  
“…[female eroticism] was the major source of corruption for the [body politic].  Female eroticism 
was particularly disturbing because it blurred the lines between private and public; eroticism was 
the intrusion into the public sphere of something that was at base private… This public would come 
to see femininity as incompatible with a virtuous public sphere.” (Hunt, 5, 7)  The mass production of 
 
2 See Margaret C. Jacob, “The Materialist World of Pornography,” in The Invention of 
Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800, ed. Lynn Hunt, New York: 
Zone Books, 1993, 158-159. 
3 See Eroticism and the Body Politic, ed. Lynn Hunt, Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991.  
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pornographic pamphlets manifested a fear of the incursion of feminine sexuality into the healthy 
body of the emerging Republican nation which would threaten that body with moral decay.   
In an engraving of 1792 which was advertised in an ultra-royalist, and of course counter-
revolutionary, newspaper, a scene of “débandement” is described, a satirical pun on the verb 
débander, meaning, “’to disband’; ‘to uncock a firearm,’ and ‘to lose one’s erection.’”4  The text 
describes the action of Théroigne de Méricourt, “’a woman of modest birth from Liège, who lived in 
France, organized groups of armed women, and was imprisoned by the Austrians and who “showed 
her République [a pun on res publique].’” (Cameron, 91.) The rest of the women are shown baring 
their buttocks to the Austrian army, an insulting gesture which has the effect of making the men fall 
down, sometimes on their own sabres, consequently “disbanding” them.  Théroigne, the woman in 
charge, in the center of the front row, exposes her pudenda, which further foils the soldiers. This 
image is interesting in terms of its performativity.  While it can be said to be depicting an event in a 
constative fashion (to use JL Austin’s word), its execution most definitely acts as a satire, reinforcing 
counterrevolutionary messages to its readership of ultra-royalist aristocrats.  The image performs a 
complex maneuver of emasculation of the revolutionary hoards, the the revoluntionary hoards 
signified, paradoxically, by the counterrevolutionary royalist army.  It’s a complex semiotic rhetorical 
strategy, but the ultimate message conveyed is that the revolutionary bands of men fighting for 
liberty, fraternity and equality, would allow women to hold the emasculating power of men, and, in 
allowing this intermixture of the sexes they are doomed to fall apart or fall down, just as the men in 
the royalist army have been disbanded and disempowered. The anonymous royalist illustrator of the 
Grand débandement was hitting the Revolutionists in their most vulnerable spot: their own fear of 
introducing sexual difference into their national collective body. Revolutionary men did fear that the 
 
4 Vivian Cameron, “Political Exposures: Sexuality and Caricature in the French Revolution,” in 
Eroticism and the Body Politic, ed. Hunt, 91.  
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presence of women would disintegrate the fraternal bonds of the Republic.  The female body was a 
foreign body to that of the French national body.  
The pun “res public” which was the word used for what Théroigne de Méricourt shows to the 
oncoming soliders, comes up again in another anonymous engraving entitled Ma Constitution. In the 
engraving, Marie Antoinette is depicted with her fictional lover, General Lafayette, Commander of 
the National Guard, who is touching her “public thing”.  In the background, we see a pedestal with 
an ejaculating penis, on which is a globe with the king’s crown being knocked off by a putti or cupid.  
This engraving serves as the frontispiece of one of the pornographic pamphlets circulating at the 
time, “The Uterine Furies of Marie Antoinette.” (approx.. 1791) (Cameron, 97) The illustration 
conveys the following meaning: the public body, a function of the king’s own body, is being 
deteriorated by the sexual appetite of the Queen, not only a woman, but a foreign, Austrian, 
adulterous woman.  Generally, the pornographic pamphlets circulating at the time relied upon a 
general fantasy about all the debauched aristocracy in the court of Versailles, but it was the female 
aristocrats in particular who were used as the main vehicles for the emboldening of a new, 
fraternally bonded, virtuous Republican body through the illustrated dramas about the Queen’s 
shocking and diverse sexual exploits. These pamphlets performed as active discursive agents which 
acted to banish the corruption to the national collective body posed by the presence of sexualized 
female bodies, bodies which should have remained in private spaces but which “got out” into the 
public domain 
The fictionalised lesbian exploits of the Queen, as well as the other exploits which included 
incestuous relations, and the illustrations that accompanied these dramatized exploits in the 
pamphlets, functioned as “proof” of the weakened power of the King, Louis 16th.  His Queen’s 
salacious extramarital relations signified his impotence, and many of the pamphlets characterised 
the Queen as being unsatisfied by the King.  As Lynn Hunt notes, 1789, the year of the French 
Revolution, marked a turning point at which the pamphlets grew in number and in the span of their 
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circulation, and, in this growth, they shifted from being scandalous stories told within the court, to 
widely published pornographic stories disseminated across a much wider general public. Today, the 
actual truth of the stories is not even relevant: public opinion, rumour and calumny work outside the 
realm of truth, purely within the realm of performative discourse.  In other words, the action and 
consequences set by the pornographic pamphlets would be the same, whether the stories about 
Marie Antoinette were true or not true in the least.   
Nevertheless, certain textual strategies may have been in place to convey a representation of truth.  
Lynn Hunt identifies the use of first-person narration (the Queen’s voice) in the Essai Historique seen 
previously, as an immediately open window into the “truth” of what was really going on inside 
Versailles.  She explains that from 1789 onwards, “the public no longer ‘hears’ courtier rumours 
through the print medium; it now ‘sees’ degeneracy in action.”5  This “seeing” of degeneracy in 
action speaks to the performativity of pornography itself, where the very utterances, both words 
and images, perform illocutionarily as being pornographic, and perlocutionarily through their 
consequences.  In this sense, all pornography is illocutionarily performative, and in this case of the 
pamphlets, the reader is not just a reader or passive viewer of the images but an active voyeur and 
even moralist. (Hunt, Erotism and the Body Politic, 120) This moralism acted to constitute the 
emerging collective body, a virtuous public body. 
Thus the pornographic stories about the court of Versailles, enhanced immensely by their 
illustrations, operated as performative utterances.  In their depiction of the debauchery of the court 
at Versailles, the publishers of the pamphlets reinforced a national identity, but at great expense to 
womankind. In Freudian terms we would say that the Queen’s   sexual voraciousness signified a 
castrative threat to the unity, and to the morality, of the nation.  In In their myriad executions (pun 
 
5 Lynn Hunt, “The Many Bodies of Marie Antoinette,” in Erotism and the Body Politic, 
119. 
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intended,) the misogynistic pamphlets about Marie Antoinette explicitly illustrated how she was 
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